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HOW SHALL WE WRITE 
THE HISTORY OF 
SELF‑DETERMINATION 
IN AUSTRALIA?
Laura Rademaker and Tim Rowse
The Uluru Statement from the Heart of May 2017 articulated 
an Indigenous vision for a better relationship between settler and 
Indigenous Australians: one ‘based on justice and self-determination’.1 
The culmination of years of consultation with Indigenous people about 
constitutional recognition, the statement proposed a referendum in 
which the Australian people could approve (or not) the formation of an 
Indigenous deliberative and advisory body – a Voice to Parliament. The 
government-appointed Referendum Council endorsed this proposal, 
but the Australian Government quickly dismissed it in October 2017. 
One prominent advocate of the Uluru Statement and member of the 
Referendum Council, Megan Davis, seemed to anticipate that response 
when, back in January 2016, she stated that ‘Australia has rejected self-
determination – freedom, agency, choice, autonomy, dignity – as being 
fundamental to Indigenous humanness and development’.2
Davis’s words are an example of a phenomenon that prompts the writing 
of this book: the interlacing of historical narratives into the discourse 
of Indigenous rights. As Bain Attwood has pointed out, Indigenous 
Australians’ political discourse about how they are entitled to be treated 
has long included a consciousness of history.3 For both Indigenous and 
1  Referendum Council, Uluru statement from the heart.
2  Davis, ‘Listening But Not Hearing’.
3  Attwood, Rights for Aborigines, see index entry ‘history, Aborigines’.
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non-Indigenous Australians, the propositions we exchange about our 
relationship resonate with frequently retold narratives of how the colonists 
and the colonised treated each other. Indigenous historical consciousness 
is rich in accounts of what Indigenous people have done: either to resist 
or to accommodate the colonists, and to assist (or sometimes to thwart) 
one another. Telling the truth about history has become so central to 
Indigenous politics that the Uluru Statement included recommending 
a truth-telling commission. Non-Indigenous historical consciousness, 
likewise, has recently become a contested awakening to difficult truths 
– how authority might have been used better, or perhaps shared through 
negotiation – pointing to possible paths of national repair.
Davis is not alone in decrying the failure of self-determination. As Patrick 
Sullivan notes, the failure of past policies for Indigenous Australia is 
something that ‘everybody knows’.4 Broadly, there are two versions 
of the failure thesis. One says that from 1973 to the final years of the 
Howard Government (1996–2007) all governments implemented ‘self-
determination’ but that this failed to empower Indigenous Australians 
and to reduce the socio-economic ‘gap’ between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians.5 The other version agrees that socio-economic 
differences have been stubbornly persistent, but accounts for it by saying 
that self-determination was never attempted or that, when attempted, 
it was crippled by underfunding and/or compromised by restraints 
imposed by Australian laws, policies, institutions and attitudes and/or 
unjustly terminated (with the Howard Government cast, usually, in the 
role of terminator). These competing histories of ‘failure’ not only point 
to contrasting prescriptions for future action but also marshal different 
understandings of what ‘self-determination’ is and could be.
Since both non-Indigenous and Indigenous Australians’ senses of political 
purpose are so saturated with narratives about what happened, what 
could have happened, and what might yet happen, the question ‘how 
shall we write the history of Indigenous Australian self-determination?’ 
is of more than simply academic interest. Answers to that question 
are inescapably political in their contribution to non-Indigenous and 
4  Sullivan, Belonging Together, 7.
5  Johns argues that had ‘self-determination’ not been attempted in Australia the following trends 
would have continued to create ‘more options and choices’ for Indigenous Australians: ‘movement 
off the land, intermarriage, general economic and cultural adjustment, and better education’. Self-
determination, he claims, has reinforced Aboriginal people’s ‘inability to adapt’. Johns, Aboriginal 
Self-determination, 66–67.
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Indigenous Australians’ understandings of their relationship and what 
that relationship might become. The aim of this book, therefore, is to 
enrich the historical consciousness in which Indigenous rights advocacy 
is embedded.
We can thus hear Davis’s January 2016 remark as a provocation to historical 
inquiry, posing the following questions for empirical investigation. How 
did Australia ‘reject self-determination’? Did ‘rejection’ take the form of 
specific actions by the state? If so, what were the dates and contexts of these 
decisive actions? Or was rejection less a set of specifiable state actions and 
more an entrenched posture of Australian society, manifest in many kinds 
of actions and attitudes? Before this ‘rejection’, did ‘Australia’ ever attempt 
‘self-determination’? If so, in what forms? And when? Why were they 
discontinued? Or has Australia never tried self-determination? If that is so, 
what would be a better description of what governments and people were 
doing when, in the 1970s, they called the new policy ‘self-determination’? 
Or was Davis’s January 2016 statement quite wrong? Perhaps Australia has 
commenced and continued to apply self-determination, so that the task 
for the historian is to narrate self-determination’s inevitable difficulties 
(including those bleak moments – such as the extinguishing of the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) in 2004–05, 
or the Northern Territory Intervention in 2007 – when what was actually 
happening seemed far from self-determination). Implicit in all these 
questions is the likelihood that ‘self-determination’ has meant different 
things to different people at different times; a history of the contest of the 
meanings of ‘self-determination’ is a necessary part of the history of our 
recent times.
Such are the questions that the authors of this book tackle. In this 
introduction we seek to distinguish between two approaches to writing 
the history of self-determination: ‘self-determination’ as what individuals 
and organisations actually did when they said they were enabling 
self-determination, and ‘self-determination’ as an ideal – derived 
from international law, political theory and Indigenous demands – 
against which actions can be judged as succeeding or failing to enable 
‘self-determination’.
The first approach seeks not to endorse any a priori definition of 
‘self-determination’, but to treat ‘self-determination’ descriptively – 
examining what Australian governments did when they said their 
policy was self-determination. This immediately raises a question of 
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periodisation. We can say with certainty that on 6 April 1973 Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam stated to a conference of Commonwealth and 
state ministers concerned with Aboriginal affairs in Adelaide that ‘the 
basic object’ of his Aboriginal affairs policy ‘is to restore to the Aboriginal 
people of Australia their lost power of self-determination in economic, 
social and political affairs’.6 What his government then did can thus 
be studied as Australia’s approach to self-determination. But after the 
Whitlam Government … ? Has this policy ever been explicitly renounced 
by subsequent governments and replaced by a policy with a different 
name and aim? There is no universally agreed answer to this question. 
In her chapter, Johanna Perheentupa argues that ‘self-determination’ 
policy ceased in 1976, when the Fraser Government preferred the label 
‘self-management’ for programs towards Indigenous Australians. In her 
view, the shift from self-determination to self-management made a real 
difference to what was possible for Indigenous Australians under Whitlam 
(1972–75) and then Fraser (1976–83). Conservative governments since 
Whitlam have been cast as enemies of self-determination, and so many 
would assent to Jon Altman’s opinion that the Australian Government’s 
self-determination policy ‘de facto ended in 1996 with Howard’s first 
election and de jure with the demise of ATSIC in 2004’.7 Perhaps 
‘neoliberalism’ has been the nemesis of self-determination? A recent 
attempt to describe Indigenous public policy in the ‘neoliberal age’ argues 
that some features of neoliberalism (such as the vesting of property rights 
in Indigenous peoples and the promotion of their economic autonomy) 
are conducive to expressed Indigenous aspirations while other features 
(the intrusive management of the poor, the insistence that Indigenous 
organisations compete for government contracts with non-Indigenous 
providers) have eroded self-determination. Neoliberalism, according to 
this argument, has done much to promote self-determination as well as 
much to undermine it.8 
We doubt that government practices changed significantly when Fraser’s 
‘self-management’ replaced Whitlam’s ‘self-determination’, and we note 
Will Sanders’s point that, although the Fraser Government promoted 
‘self-management’ as different, the instances of self-management to 
which it pointed were the same as those that exemplified the Whitlam 
Government’s self-determination. They were: the formation of the National 
6  Whitlam, ‘Aboriginals and Society’.
7  Email to the editors, 24 October 2019.
8  Howard-Wagner, Bargh and Altamirano-Jimenèz, ‘From New Paternalism’.
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Aboriginal Conference in 1977 (as a successor to the National Aboriginal 
Consultative Committee); ‘the influence of Aboriginal organisations 
such as legal aid and Aboriginal health; the opportunity for Aboriginal 
councils to provide municipal services in the larger remote settlements; 
and the opportunity to choose “a traditional lifestyle” by movement to 
outstations’.9 The difficulty of deciding when Australian governments 
ceased to be committed to ‘self-determination’ is made even more evident 
if we note that as recently as 2007 one agency of the Howard Government 
urged ‘that any means of protecting Indigenous cultural and intellectual 
property is based on the principle of self-determination’.10 In sum, while 
there is little doubt that the Whitlam Government wanted its programs to 
be understood as embodying a policy of ‘self-determination’, the duration 
of the self-determination policy era remains a matter for interpretation.11
As editors, we welcome the approach taken by several of the authors 
in this book: that what the Whitlam and successor governments did – 
laws, reports, policies, institutions – can be understood as exemplifying 
Australia’s approach to ‘self-determination’. When this approach finds 
continuities between preceding policies – protection, assimilation – and 
Australian practices of self-determination, the inference is not necessarily 
that these residues are flaws in self-determination. In fact, there is no 
presumption, in this descriptive approach, that ‘self-determination’ 
should be a radical rupture with the colonial past. Even if some promoters 
of self-determination in the early 1970s emphasised the novelty of actions 
taken in the name of self-determination and celebrated them as the 
repudiation of a bad past, historians working from what we are calling 
a descriptive perspective are not obliged to agree. Issues of periodisation, 
continuity and rupture are open to debate.
9  Sanders, ‘From Self-determination to Self-management’, 8.
10  Australia Council for the Arts, Protocols, 8. The protocols declare: ‘Indigenous people have the right 
to self-determination in their cultural affairs and the expression of their cultural material’ (p. 12).
11  Just as it remains a matter for debate when ‘assimilation’ ceased to be Australian Government 
policy. In the 1960s, critics of ‘assimilation’ sometimes presented what they considered to be a less 
coercive policy, which they called ‘integration’. What distinguished ‘integration’ was professed respect 
for Indigenous choices about the pace and manner of their acculturation to the Australian way of life. 
‘Integration’ recognised value in distinctly ‘Aboriginal’ or Torres Strait Islander customs, including 
their senses of shared identity and their social solidarity or ‘group life’. Russell McGregor presents 
a well-documented and thoughtful discussion of the relationship between the terms ‘assimilation’ and 
‘integration’ in the 1960s. While the advocacy of ‘integration’ can be seen as paving the way for ‘self-
determination’ to be declared the new policy ideal in 1973, advocates of ‘Black Power’ were suspicious 
of ‘integration’, just as they were adamantly opposed to ‘assimilation’. McGregor, Indifferent, 177–78.
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The second approach to Indigenous self-determination is more explicitly 
critical, as it measures the practice of self-determination against what 
Indigenous Australians have said that they wanted (or what the historian 
infers that they wanted), or what human rights doctrines (in law or 
in political thought) say they are entitled to. This prescriptive use of 
‘self-determination’ seems to be the perspective that Davis voiced in 
2016. This approach views history from the standpoint of an ideal of self-
determination that arises from empathy with Indigenous Australians as 
an imagined subject of history and/or from doctrines of law or concepts 
in political theory to which the historian assents. The historian then 
gives a more judgemental account of what actually happened, enabling 
the reader to see the gap between the ideal and the reality of its flawed 
Australian practice. Comparison with other settler colonial societies 
may also inform histories that invoke international law. The historian 
working in this second perspective may give significance to questions 
of periodisation, continuity and rupture, arguing, for example, that 
it is a  political indictment of governments and others if elements of 
‘protection’ and ‘assimilation’ can be detected in practices whose stated 
intention was ‘self-determination’. For example, in her 1977 review of 
10 years of Australian policy innovation, Marcia Langton asserted that 
‘self-determination is a front for assimilation and exploitation’.12
In our invitations to participate in our October 2018 workshop, and in 
our subsequent conversations with authors, we welcomed both descriptive 
and normative approaches. Indeed, some chapters demonstrate different 
ways to combine the descriptive and the normative. We do not claim 
that this book is an Indigenous history of self-determination. Although 
it is produced in partnership with and includes contributions from 
leading Indigenous scholars, it does not represent the diverse views, 
experiences and ambitions of Indigenous people on questions of self-
determination. We hope that this book will be useful to Indigenous 
thinkers and activists, even as we anticipate learning from their insights 
and critiques. We also hope to see more feminist scholarship around the 
history of self-determination. We have questions about the gendering of 
self-determination policies, how they unevenly affected Indigenous men 
and women and played into (or challenged) existing gender politics of 
Indigenous and settler communities, that we were unable to address in 
12  Langton, ‘Self-determination as Oppression’, 5.
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this volume. There is likewise scope for further research in the history of 
self-determination and the arts as well as the international movements 
for Indigenous self-determination and their connections to Australia. 
Self‑determination as what was done
What were the policy innovations that the Whitlam Government called 
‘self-determination’ and that the Fraser Government subsequently 
endorsed as ‘self-management’? While no list is definitive, here is ours: 
• establishing a 1973–74 Royal Commission on land rights whose report 
led to a 1975 Bill and then to the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976
• establishing a national agency, the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, 
represented by a minister in Cabinet and making grants to Indigenous 
organisations, including to remote missions and settlements that were 
evolving into Indigenous townships and to Aboriginal-controlled 
urban service organisations
• establishing the National Aboriginal Consultative Committee 
(NACC) as an elected advisory body in 1973, and replacing it with 
the National Aboriginal Conference in 1977
• establishing the Aboriginal Land Fund Commission, to purchase 
economic and cultural assets for Aboriginal people to own
• affirming the inherent worth of Indigenous cultures. This included 
support for bilingual education, and it required the Australia Council, 
the arts patronage body formed in 1973, to include an Aboriginal 
Arts Board, made up entirely of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people appointed by the minister for the arts
• outlawing racial discrimination (the Racial Discrimination Act 1975), 
while providing for lawful discrimination in favour of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people
• legislating to facilitate Indigenous Australians to form corporations, to 
enable their collective action (the Aboriginal Councils and Associations 
Act 1976)
• initiating consultation with Torres Strait Islanders about where to 
place the border between Australia and Papua New Guinea, and 
signing a treaty with Papua New Guinea in 1978 that made substantial 
concessions to Islanders’ demands.
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Each of these elements of ‘self-determination’ is dealt with both 
descriptively and evaluatively in this book.
Continuities with earlier practices
Many of these innovations had continuities with practices under 
the preceding policy of assimilation. Sana Nakata’s chapter reveals 
that changes to the Census (between the 1966 and 1971 censuses) that 
acknowledged the social, rather than biological bases of self-identification 
preceded the government’s commitment to self-determination. Sanders 
shows that the introduction of municipal government in remote regions 
began as an assimilatory policy and continued as a way to deal with 
the changes in land title mandated by self-determination. Similarly, as 
Rademaker demonstrates, the missions in the 1960s were rediscovering 
the nineteenth-century missiological concept of an ‘Indigenous church’: 
‘Aboriginal people taking responsibility for church life, expressed 
in their own languages, cultures and governance’. The missions also 
supported moves for Aboriginal political representation, considering all 
these as consistent with the government’s policy of assimilation. Chris 
Haynes reveals how Northern Territory Welfare Branch officers sought 
to respond to Aboriginal initiative during the ‘assimilation’ years, and 
he dates support for the outstation movement to the mid-1960s.13 
Perheentupa points out that some Aboriginal organisations funded under 
‘self-determination’ policy had been set up to deliver ‘welfare’ and that 
what government conceived as the goals of ‘welfare’ were similar to the 
aims of ‘assimilation’; how to practise ‘self-determination’ thus became 
an issue between these organisations and the government. Likewise, 
Boughton includes within his account of self-determination Aboriginal 
education collectives, such as Tranby, that date from the 1950s when they 
were supported as agencies promoting assimilation. Finally, as Simpson 
shows, mother-tongue education was central to the mission educations 
at Hermannsburg and Ernabella (admittedly, these missions were in the 
minority), long before Whitlam. 
13  This is amply demonstrated by some outstation histories. See Peterson and Myers, Experiments 
in Self-determination.
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So what distinguished Australian practices of self-determination from 
policy approaches before 1973? Was there a core policy logic that marked 
self-determination as a rupture with previous policy eras? Some would say 
that giving Indigenous Australians land title (mostly to former reserves) 
was self-determination’s defining rupture from ‘assimilation’, but against 
this view we make two observations. First, South Australia, Victoria, New 
South Wales and Western Australia were already beginning to vest reserve 
titles in Aboriginal trusts in the years 1966–72, arguably as an adjustment 
in their tactics of assimilation.14 Second, as Maria John argues in her 
chapter, to postulate land rights as self-determination’s prerequisite or 
distinctive feature ignores what urban Indigenous people have said about 
the struggle for Indigenous health.
As some of our authors note, steps taken in the name of self-determination 
were sometimes presented as primarily leading to economic independence 
and the amelioration of disadvantage. Jon Altman reminds us that the 
goal of ‘social and economic equality’ underpinned government support 
for land rights. To Justice Woodward, for instance, land rights were 
a ‘first essential step for people who are economically depressed’.15 Mike 
Dillon begins his history of capital funds in 1968, when the Australian 
Government, in the name of ‘assimilation’, created the Commonwealth 
Capital Fund for Aboriginal Enterprises. Some of the Aboriginal Cattle 
Enterprises supported under self-determination policy, Charlie Ward 
shows, began as ‘assimilation’ programs on missions and reserves. The 
Whitlam Government was ‘predisposed to support’ what it understood 
to be Gurindji aspirations to run their own cattle enterprise, giving 
‘insufficient thought to whether incorporated proprietary companies 
were appropriate vehicles for remote Indigenous aspirations’. As Ward 
points out, the increasing availability of welfare payments (according to 
assimilation’s quest for ‘equality’) contributed to the economic autonomy 
for individuals of the next generation, frustrating the Gurindji elders’ 
authority as managers. Other contributors suggest that the underlying 
logic of self-determination policy was to encourage ‘responsibility’, 
implying control and self-governance. In his study of the superintendency 
of John Hunter at Maningrida, Haynes identifies the desire to foster 
Aboriginal initiative, self-motivation and ‘responsibility’ as integral to 
a burgeoning self-determination in Arnhem Land. Rademaker suggests 
14  Rowse, Indigenous and other Australians, 325–28.
15  Woodward, Aboriginal Land Rights Commission, 2.
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that self-determination and assimilation as applied on Christian missions 
shared a common interest in Aboriginal people ‘taking responsibility’, the 
difference under self-determination being that they were to do so now 
rather than at some future date.
However, what was imagined as ‘control’ varied. In her chapter outlining 
the Royal Commission on Government Administration (RCAGA), 
Elizabeth Ganter explains that, for some, it was mere consultation and 
‘respect for Aboriginal aspirations’, while for others it required Aboriginal 
involvement in decision-making. In his analysis of the creation of 
municipal governance on discrete Indigenous communities, Will Sanders 
suggests we can see the limits of self-determination policy: were discrete 
communities on Aboriginal land made up of ‘self-governing landowners’ 
or merely ‘self-servicing landholders’?
The recognition of Indigenous peoplehood was central to the developing 
body of international law on self-determination, as Asmi Wood’s chapter 
shows. ‘Peoples’ are not statistically aggregated individuals; they enact their 
peoplehood as a capacity for collective action by forming institutions. 
It is therefore significant that one enduring Australian practice of self-
determination that distinguishes it from assimilation is to encourage the 
formation of groups – imagining Indigenous advancement as the work 
of potent collectives and not just of successful individuals. Katie Curchin 
and Tim Rowse trace the history of the statutory regulation of Indigenous 
corporations, arguing that the robust Indigenous sector is the product 
of self-determination. Mike Dillon also argues that self-determination 
continues to mean a government preference to engage with Indigenous 
people as groups, rather than as individuals. Tim Rowse argues that Torres 
Strait Islanders had long been treated as a collective political entity through 
Queensland’s practices of ‘indirect rule’. The Whitlam Government’s 
innovation in 1973 brought the Commonwealth Government into this 
scene, vying with Queensland as the government that would recognise 
and reward Torres Strait collectivity. 
If ‘self-determination’ meant recognising Indigenous peoples as collective 
actors, it also raised the issue of cultural difference: did government policy 
enable ‘groups’ only on the condition that their goals and methods depart 
from ‘custom’ in order to conform to non-Indigenous Australian norms? 
Jon Altman’s chapter is about the tension between landowners ‘becoming 
equal and remaining different’. At the same time as they have become 
landowners, the distinct peoplehood of Indigenous Australians in their 
11
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land use has come under pressure. In our two chapters on education 
(Bob  Boughton and Jane Simpson), the recognition of Indigenous 
people as peoples made for a new urgency in Indigenous control over 
training and education. No longer focused on educating the individual, 
the assumption under self-determination was that Indigenous people 
required language and literacy skills to represent themselves and pursue 
their interests as peoples.
Yet, well before Australian governments committed to self-
determination, they were professing respect for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander cultural  heritage. Rademaker shows that the protection 
of Aboriginal cultural life was key to missionaries’ re-imagining their 
role in Aboriginal communities in the 1960s. Self-determination meant 
that Aboriginal people were to be ‘free’ to be Christians in their own way. 
Part of the legacy of the missionisation of these communities, which 
Simpson identifies, is that Aboriginal people’s cultural rights to language 
received broader recognition from governments than their communication 
rights. Indigenous health services in both Australia and the United States 
were, as Maria John reveals, not only sites of Indigenous control but also 
environments where Indigenous people could be ‘proud to be themselves’. 
Self-governance of these organisations was not an end in itself; it was 
a means to create urban spaces where Indigenous cultures could flourish.
Given these complexities, as editors, we remain agnostic on the question 
of whether ‘self-determination’ had a ‘core’ that marked it as distinct. 
Perhaps what most marks the initiatives listed above as a break from the 
past was the rhetoric of their presentation and the matching enthusiasm 
and commitment of the Indigenous people who engaged.
Self‑determination as Indigenous project
The normative approach to writing the history of self-determination 
understands self-determination as an ongoing Indigenous ambition within 
a project of decolonisation. This understanding was reflected in the Uluru 
Statement and, before it, the Redfern Statement (2008) and Barunga 
Statement (1988), each demanding Indigenous ‘self-determination’. 
In his 1999 Vincent Lingiari lecture, Pat Dodson claimed that ‘Aboriginal 
peoples have the right to self-determination’, that is, the right to 
‘negotiate our political status and to pursue economic, social and cultural 
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development’.16 Despite the shortcomings of rights-based discourses 
(discussed further below), Indigenous people have harnessed the language 
and visions of self-determination discourses within international law and 
turned these to their own purposes. 
For many Indigenous people, ‘self-determination’ has meant not only 
choosing how they will relate to the settler colonial state and economy, 
but also making choices that would maximise autonomy, driven by 
a shared memory or imagined ideal of the autonomy they enjoyed before 
colonisation began. The Whitlam Government’s claim to ‘restore to the 
Aboriginal people of Australia their lost power of self-determination in 
economic, social and political affairs’ reflected this understanding.17 Many 
Indigenous Australians understand self-determination to refer to the 
political realisation of their inextinguishable sovereignty: they never ceded 
their sovereignty and never could or would cede it. By this understanding, 
Indigenous ‘self-determination’, though never entirely lost, was (and is) 
under continual attack by processes of colonisation. Consequently, for 
many Indigenous people, ‘self-determination’ could not be ‘bestowed’ by 
governments, it must be asserted, practised and maintained, often despite 
government policy. As Wiradjuri scholar Robynne Quiggin argued, 
‘we have a long history of “setting our own course” despite the rejection, 
confinement and cruelty of colonisation’.18
This question of who owns or confers self-determination (and whose 
interests it ultimately serves), has led some Indigenous thinkers to adopt 
other frames for Indigenous political mobilisation. As Borrows and Tully19 
recently articulated, Indigenous projects of decolonisation are being 
conceptualised either as projects of ‘reconciliation’ with the settler state 
that might, for instance, include demands for treaties, recognition, return 
of land, rights and reparations, or as what some call ‘resurgence’, that is, of 
reclaiming Indigenous cultures, lands and ways of being without reference 
to the colonisers. For those seeking resurgence, reconciliatory movements 
can entail colonising concessions. But where do claims to self-determination 
fit in relation to these projects? Are claims for self-determination claims 
of resurgence – because self-determination entails restoring to Indigenous 
people their authority? Or is demanding Indigenous self-determination 
16  Dodson, ‘Until the Chains Are Broken’, 29.
17  Whitlam, ‘Aboriginals and Society’ (emphasis added). See also Hocking, ‘A Transforming 
Sentiment’, S5–S12.
18  Quiggin, ‘What Does Democracy and Self-determination Mean’, S52–S53.
19  Borrows and Tully, ‘Introduction’, 1–6.
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an act of reconciliation – because it demands concessions from the settler 
state? The settler state has an incentive to make such concessions: these 
might give it the moral legitimacy it craves. Stephen Young points out that 
the state’s recognition of Indigenous people, their nationhood and self-
determination, also serves to legitimate its own assertions of sovereignty 
and nationhood.20 As Noel Pearson recently argued, restoring Indigenous 
people in Australia their right to ‘self-determination’ and ‘responsibility’ 
would create a ‘more complete Commonwealth’.21
For some, ‘self-determination’ is no longer the right way to conceptualise 
the pursuit of Indigenous interests. Cherokee political scientist Jeff 
Corntassel argues that the failure of the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) to uphold Indigenous peoples’ 
land and water cultural relationships, favouring instead the territorial 
integrity of the state, is indicative of the false promises of rights-based and 
state-centred strategies for achieving decolonisation.22 Quiggin also noted 
that ‘self-determination has its origins in the processes of imperialism and 
the development of the nation state’, that is, the very processes that fuelled 
the dispossession of Indigenous people.23 For her, this is not a reason 
for Indigenous people to reject self-determination but a reason to assert 
their own self-determination more forcefully in the face of colonising 
authorities. As Anishinaabe scholar Aaron Mills similarly pointed out, 
‘self-determination is the language of our settler-colonizer’.24 Mills argued 
that self-determination undercuts Indigenous conceptions of selfhood 
and political community that value interdependence and relationship. For 
Indigenous people, freedom is not about ‘standing apart’ but ‘standing 
with’ the other.25 Where Indigenous people mobilise state-centric rights 
discourses that focus on the supposedly autonomous self, their demands 
cannot lead to a sustainable self-determination based upon spiritual 
foundations and on Indigenous peoples’ relationships and responsibilities 
to the natural world. Dene political theorist Glen Coulthard argued in 
2007 for Indigenous practices ‘less oriented’ to attaining ‘affirmative 
[forms] of recognition from the settler state and society, and more 
about critically revaluating, reconstructing and redeploying culture and 
20  Young, ‘The Self Divided’, 195.
21  Pearson, ‘A Rightful Place’, 72.
22  Corntassel, ‘Re-envisioning Resurgence’, 92.
23  Quiggin ‘What does’, S52.
24  Mills, ‘Rooted Constitutionalism’, 160.
25  Mills, ‘Rooted Constitutionalism’, 160.
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tradition in ways that seek to prefigure, alongside those with similar 
ethical commitments, a radical alternative to the structural and psycho-
affective facets of colonial domination’.26
Aileen Moreton-Robinson makes a similar critique while also distinguishing 
the Indigenous male from the Indigenous female as a self-determining 
subject. Her Indigenous feminist critique of self-determination as 
espoused by liberal settler colonial governments argues that Indigenous 
women give priority to the collective rights of Indigenous people rather 
than to the individual rights of liberal citizenship. This means that 
‘Indigenous women’s perceptions of self-determination and sovereignty 
are not consistent with the liberal idea that, through citizenship, self-
determination can be realised’.27 While she does not abandon the 
language of self-determination, Moreton-Robinson is sceptical of the 
ability of settler colonial governments’ policies of ‘self-determination’ 
to empower Indigenous women. Megan Davis has also differentiated 
the Indigenous subject by gender, arguing that ‘the right to self-
determination’ has ‘promoted an impoverished form of self-determination 
for Aboriginal women in Australia’.28 Davis’s argument is not so grounded 
in an assumption of Indigenous women’s cultural distinction: she draws 
on Martha Nussbaum’s argument that implementing human rights 
necessitates attention to the practical ‘capabilities’ of all humans, and 
she is more optimistic than Moreton-Robinson about the liberal settler 
colonial state’s ability to realise human rights.
For Indigenous activist and public intellectual Noel Pearson, self-
determination is best applied on the levels of both individual and 
community. ‘Liberty, responsibility and self-determination’ are, to him, 
‘basically the same’. They are all about ‘the freedom and power to choose’.29 
Pearson argued that the right of self-determination includes the ability 
and ‘right’ to ‘take responsibility’.30 Notions of ‘responsibility’ – both 
individual and collective – are familiar to many Indigenous people who 
feel a keen sense of responsibility to their country, ancestors and kin.31 
For many Indigenous people, these responsibilities are also the grounds of 
Indigenous sovereignty. Though Pearson is strongly committed to the idea 
26  Coulthard, ‘Subjects of Empire’, 456.
27  Moreton-Robinson, ‘Patriarchal Whiteness’, 70.
28  Davis, ‘Aboriginal Women’, 78–88, 79.
29  Pearson, ‘A Rightful Place’, 43.
30  Pearson, Up from the Mission. 167.
31  Corntassel, ‘Re-envisioning Resurgence’, 93.
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that Indigenous Australians are ‘peoples’, he does not use the language of 
‘sovereignty’. Pearson argues that an obsession with ‘self-determination 
and international law’ and ‘concepts of autonomy and sovereignty’ 
have distracted from the ‘practical realities of self-determination’.32 
By ‘practical realities’ he means the financial and social capital that would 
enable Indigenous people to make decisions about their lives. Decisions 
about how to take responsibility might even lead to ‘assimilation’, 
a possibility raised by Mike Dillon in this volume (considering the forms 
that Indigenous ‘wealth’ can take) as well as by Michael Mansell. Mansell 
identifies three political options for Indigenous Australians under self-
determination: ‘to form a new state through secession, agree to autonomy 
or association in a federal state, or to integrate or assimilate in a single 
unitary state’.33
But elsewhere ‘sovereignty’ has risen to prominence in Indigenous 
political discourse since it emerged in the 1960s.34 Sovereignty and self-
determination are often used together, presented as two approaches to or 
conceptualisations of a single struggle, as John’s chapter points out.35 While 
critiquing both ‘sovereignty’ and ‘self-determination’ as European imports 
to Indigenous political discourses,36 Taiaiake Alfred described ‘the two 
most important strategies’ for Indigenous people as ‘assertion of prior and 
coexisting sovereignty’ and ‘the assertion of a right of self-determination’, 
describing these strategies as ‘woven together’.37 To  Leroy Little Bear, 
sovereignty is ‘about making your own decisions, following your own 
mind, being self-determining’ without forgetting our interdependence; 
sovereignty is ‘qualified by your dependence on other people’.38 
In Australia, Michael Mansell explained that ‘sovereignty’ underpins other 
Indigenous ambitions, including self-determination.39 In 2003, Larissa 
Behrendt described ‘recognition of sovereignty as an expression of distinct 
identity and a starting point for the exercise of self-determination as 
a way of achieving empowerment, autonomy and equality’.40 In 2013 she 
distinguished ‘self-determination’ (‘when Indigenous people are involved 
32  Pearson, Up from the Mission, 168.
33  Mansell, Treaty and Statehood, 165.
34  Moreton-Robinson, ‘Introduction’, 3.
35  Strelein, ‘Missed Meanings’, 85, 89.
36  Alfred, ‘Sovereignty’, 40.
37  Alfred, ‘Sovereignty’, 37.
38  Little Bear, ‘An Elder Explains Indigenous Philosophy’, 7.
39  Mansell, Treaty and Statehood, 74.
40  Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice, 115.
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in the setting of priorities within their community, the development of 
policy, the delivery of services, and the implementation of programs’) from 
‘sovereignty’ (‘when control is given centrally to Aboriginal people without 
constraint’). Indigenous Australians have sometimes practised both self-
determination and sovereignty: ‘many successful programs … [have been] 
developed by community members, often without government assistance, 
such as night patrols, dry-out areas, and safe houses’.41
Non-Indigenous Australians have sometimes responded defensively to 
Indigenous claims of ‘sovereignty’, despite its close association with self-
determination (which is seen as less threatening) and notwithstanding 
that sovereignties can be understood as multiple and overlapping.42 
Tim Rowse’s chapter is a caution against assuming that the Indigenous 
assertion of sovereignty necessitates the rejection of Australian sovereignty. 
When Torres Strait Islanders asserted their customary interest in the social 
and ecological relations of the border between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea, they insisted that their lands and seas be protected by continuing 
to remain under Australian sovereignty. Indigenous claims to sovereignty 
do, however, expose the fragility of the settler state’s own claims. As Asmi 
Wood explains, in law ‘there is no doctrinal answer to the question of how 
[non-Indigenous or colonial] sovereignty was acquired’. There is, therefore, 
‘both an opportunity and a space for negotiations and discussions on self-
determination without preconditions’, and ‘the principle of uti possidetis 
puts Indigenous Australians in a position to negotiate under international 
law’. Perhaps the growing appeal of the language of sovereignty to 
Indigenous activists is that they believe self-determination to have failed: 
they are looking for new ways to make settler colonial society pay attention 
to their claims.
Self‑determination and international law
Dylan Lino has summarised what extant international law offers to 
Indigenous Australians:
First, the established international law is very specific, entailing 
a limited number of legal remedies, for example decolonisation, 
that have no applicability to Indigenous peoples in settler-colonial 
41  Behrendt, ‘Aboriginal Sovereignty’, 171–72.
42  Behrendt, Achieving Social Justice, 115; Strelein, ‘Missed Meanings’, 85.
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states like Australia. Second, despite the presently limited nature 
of the established law on self-determination, the law is continuing 
to develop. It is true that legal rules applying the right of self-
determination to Indigenous peoples are yet to crystallise into 
a clear and cogent body of law, but there is certainly a space in 
international law – especially post-UNDRIP – in which to flesh 
out an Indigenous right of self-determination. Third, the direction 
in which the nascent law on Indigenous self-determination is 
developing is moving away from secession and independence and 
towards internal, intra-state configurations.43
Three chapters of this volume engage with international law as a resource 
for Indigenous political thought.
Asmi Wood points out that self-determination began to circulate as a 
concept of international law when Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Ilyich 
Lenin enunciated it, in their different ways, in 1918. The Charter of the 
United Nations in 1945 mentions ‘self-determination’, and the concept 
has been the focus of discussion and development in UN forums ever 
since. In 2007, the UNDRIP included:
Article 3.
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely 
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Article 4.
Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, 
have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating 
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for 
financing their autonomous functions.44
As Maria John observes in her chapter, the UNDRIP was deliberately 
unspecific about the scope of Indigenous peoples’ self-determination. 
It references only internal matters and ‘local affairs’, and it does not 
allow territorial sovereignty as a basis of Indigenous self-determination. 
Self-determination as a norm of international law has disappointed 
some Indigenous people who see it as too vague and imprecise to serve 
as a foundation for Indigenous claims.45 Wood argues that Australian 
43  Lino, ‘The Politics of Inclusion’, 850.
44  United Nations, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
45  Mansell, Treaty and Statehood, 194.
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Indigenous people should nevertheless continue to press for Australia to 
legislate to ratify the UNDRIP. This would compel Australian courts to 
adjudicate disputes around Indigenous self-determination with regard 
to international law and literature, giving Indigenous people greater 
opportunity to exercise their peoplehood under the law, as well as laying 
the ground for treaty negotiations.
Sana Nakata also refers to self-determination as a concept in international 
law, alluding – like Wood – to the UN Charter, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In her reading of the history 
of ‘self-determination’, there is a deep connection between the right of 
an individual to identify with a ‘people’ and the right of that ‘people’ 
to self-determination; that is, both rights make appeal to the values of 
‘Autonomy. Freedom. Sovereignty … concepts that attach as much to 
individual human beings as they attach to nations and states’. Nakata 
then argues that the institutional form of peoplehood can be evaluated 
according to its practice towards the autonomy of the individual. 
Nakata and others are therefore troubled by the way that the state has 
delegated the adjudication of individuals’ claims to be ‘Aboriginal’ to 
the Indigenous sector. In Australia, she argues, the colonial sovereign’s 
criteria for recognising a people are likely to result in the mis-recognition 
of some individuals. Nakata draws on Bronwen Carlson’s ethnography 
The Politics of Identity to illustrate Indigenous experiences of mis-
recognition that seem to have become increasingly common in the early 
twenty-first century – that is, of having one’s identity claims rejected by 
Indigenous organisations. If the purpose of ‘recognition’ is ‘justice’, then 
mis-recognition (rejecting a person’s claim to be Aboriginal) is injustice, 
Nakata argues. The injustice of such mis-recognition is compounded 
where the state empowers Indigenous organisations to give or withhold 
recognition. She also raises the possibility that, as Indigenous Australian 
claims give emphasis to constitutional recognition of peoplehood, there 
will be less need for any authority to judge an individual’s claim to be 
Indigenous. Nakata insists that Indigeneity is too dynamic historically to 
be contained by official criteria, not least because both colonisation and 
the pursuit of rights are ongoing disruptors of Indigeneity. 
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Failure narratives and self‑determination
Many accounts of self-determination have argued true ‘self-determination’ 
(variously defined) was never really attempted in Australia because, in 
valuing the preservation of Indigenous cultural difference, the policy 
set limits to Indigenous choices to change. Pearson, for instance, argued 
that self-determination failed because the ‘preservation of some kind of 
imagined cultural purity’ trumped giving Indigenous people real choices 
about ‘how to reconcile their cultures with the demands of development’.46 
In Peter Sutton’s view, the new rights of the self-determination era were 
not matched with measures ‘designed to assist people through the crises of 
occupation, discipline, motivation, conflict management and community 
trauma that soon erupted and by the 1990s had reached a crescendo, 
especially in the remoter regions’.47 Likewise, according to conservative 
commentator Gary Johns, self-determination was never really tried, 
because a commitment to an idealised version of Aboriginal cultures, 
together with an incoherent pursuit of both Aboriginal separatism 
and integration, prevented Aboriginal people from pursuing their own 
interests.48 Moreover, Johns argues that Aboriginal people lacked the 
capacity to manage their own affairs and to make decisions, meaning that 
they ‘won their freedom and lost their livelihood’: self-determination as 
practised in the 1970s was never true freedom.49
Refuting Johns and reviewing policy from 1972 to 2005, Stuart Bradfield 
argued that self-determination enacted ‘a logic of “domestication”, 
which acts to manage and curtail Indigenous separatism, rather than 
give expression to it’.50 Aboriginal political identities were ‘contained’ 
via ‘impotent representative bodies’ from the 1970s. Land rights were 
granted, but were always managed by the state.51 Even ATSIC, supposedly 
exemplary of self-determination, remained subject to federal control 
and was eventually dismantled, as Aileen Moreton-Robinson, Elizabeth 
Strakosch and Will Sanders also note.52 Moreton-Robinson argues that 
46  Pearson, ‘A Rightful Place’, 47.
47  Sutton, The Politics of Suffering, 58.
48  Johns, ‘The Failure of Aboriginal Separatism’, 18.
49  Johns, ‘The Failure of Aboriginal Separatism’, 12.
50  Bradfield, ‘Separatism or Status-Quo?’, 82.
51  Bradfield, ‘Separatism or Status-Quo?’, 84.
52  Bradfield, ‘Separatism or Status-Quo?’, 88; Moreton-Robinson, ‘Introduction’, 4; Strakosch, 
‘The Technical Is Political’, 126; Sanders, ‘Missing ATSIC’, 113–30.
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so-called ‘self-determination’ policy was only ever ‘self-management’.53 
This position is also reflected by some authors in this volume. Perheentupa, 
for instance, argues that the Department of Aboriginal Affairs never 
intended to give Aboriginal organisations the autonomy they claimed 
and that the  1975 shift to ‘self-management’ further undermined 
Aboriginal autonomy.
Many Indigenous intellectuals insist that Indigenous demands were 
not heard under self-determination. Gary Foley, for instance, lamented 
that Indigenous leaders were quickly disappointed by the gap between 
the Whitlam Government’s promises to Indigenous people and its 
actions, particularly its failure to enact its stated principle that Aboriginal 
people should run their own affairs (which Foley calls ‘sovereignty’).54 
Ian Anderson  traced a state of ‘chronic crisis’ in Indigenous policy 
and politics, dating back to the removal of barriers to citizenship for 
Indigenous Australians (presumably in the late 1960s).55 The perpetual 
crisis, Anderson argued, is attributable in part to institutional structures 
of our parliamentary system that have never required consultation with 
Indigenous people or representation of Indigenous interests.56 There was no 
structural mechanism to ensure self-determination for Indigenous people. 
Numerous scholars from an anthropological background have pointed 
to cultural barriers to self-determination. As Cowlishaw argued, under 
self-determination the ‘bourgeois ideal of autonomous, self-willed 
subjects’ drove policies and governance of Aboriginal people. Aboriginal 
communities were to learn to value independence, self-management and 
autonomy, whether these represented Aboriginal values or not.57 Tatz 
objected to the artificial formation of these ‘autonomous’ communities. 
These had previously been ruled as ‘total institutions’ (i.e. as missions or 
settlements), often consisting of tribal and language groups with conflicting 
interests, frequently rivalries, but were made to become ‘communities’, 
‘regardless of whether or not there was an actual communitas’.58 The 
forms of governance these communities were made to adopt bore little 
resemblance to Indigenous peoples’ own ways of governing themselves.
53  Moreton-Robinson, ‘Introduction’, 4.
54  Foley, ‘The Australian Labor Party’, 125.
55  Anderson, ‘The Crisis of Australia’s Indigenous Policy’, 54.
56  Anderson, ‘The Crisis of Australia’s Indigenous Policy’, 59.
57  Cowlishaw, ‘Erasing Culture and Race’, 150.
58  Tatz, Aboriginal Suicide, 27.
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Others suggest that self-determination was attempted, but later 
undermined. The shift in government focus towards ‘reconciliation’ 
in the 1990s, followed by the Howard Government’s emphasis on 
‘practical reconciliation’ and the policy of ‘closing the gap’, have eroded 
policies of self-determination by deliberately avoiding and undermining 
Indigenous claims to sovereignty and self-determination.59 Under the 
Abbott Government’s Indigenous Advancement Strategy, funding 
for non-Indigenous organisations with ‘Reconciliation Action Plans’ 
and ‘philanthrocapitalism’ ‘replaced self-determination as the path to 
modernisation’, argues Davis. What some call ‘neoliberal’ commitments 
reframed Aboriginal polities simply as the ‘Indigenous sector’, along with 
the ‘business sector’ or ‘education sector’. When understood as a mere 
‘sector’, Davis argues, Indigenous Australians are denied the right to self-
determination.60 With the return of a conservative national government 
in 1996, governments showed greater antipathy to rights-based policy 
agendas for Indigenous people. Indigenous services were instead to be 
‘mainstreamed’ and ‘normalised’ within a broader ‘neoliberal’ agenda.61 
As noted above, one of the effects of the ‘neoliberal age’ is a return to 
government intrusion in Indigenous peoples’ private lives.62 Chapters 
by Altman and Boughton are instances of this failure narrative, arguing 
that ‘neoliberal’ reforms beginning in the 1990s undermined previous 
gains for Aboriginal people. According to this understanding, the ‘deficit 
discourse’ that accompanied ‘practical reconciliation’ and the ‘closing the 
gap’ agenda further discredited self-determination. As Laurie Bamblett 
argued, describing and defining Indigenous people only in terms of 
disadvantage and deficit ‘makes it easier to deny Aboriginal communities 
self-determination on the grounds of incapability’.63
59  Ladner, ‘Proceed with Caution’, 250.
60  Davis, ‘Gesture Politics’.
61  Lovell, ‘Languages of Neoliberal Critique’, 223.
62  Howard-Wagner, Bargh and Altamirano-Jiménez, ‘From New Paternalism to New Imaginings’, 
14–15.
63  Bamblett, ‘Serious Whitefella Stuff’, 81.
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Self‑determination as a concept implicit 
in Indigenous action
The historian who wishes to compare the actual practice of self-
determination to what Indigenous Australians wanted (or to what, in 
the historian’s opinion, they were entitled) may search for statements 
by Indigenous people and/or by authorities concerned with formulating 
Indigenous rights or at least human rights. However, historians might 
also infer Indigenous conceptions of ‘self-determination’ from actions and 
from words that do not include the phrase ‘self-determination’.
The fact that Indigenous Australians have been a colonised people is, 
for some historians, sufficient basis for attributing to them a strong 
desire for self-determination. According to this approach, the task for 
the historian is to discover the contingent expressions of that desire in 
what Indigenous Australians said (or did not say) and what they did (or 
did not do) in specified times and places. Anthropological research has 
sometimes deciphered political messages in Indigenous Australians’ ritual 
innovation. Ronald Berndt, for instance, interpreted the Yolngu decision 
to display secret objects in 1958 as expressing a desire for a ‘greater 
measure of control over their own affairs, politically and religiously, 
and especially in relation to education and employment’.64 Berndt, 
however, did not call this a claim to ‘self-determination’; that concept 
in international law had not yet acquired the ‘domestic’ meaning it later 
gained. In some contexts, explicit programmatic statements by Indigenous 
Australians are discoverable in the archive and easy to interpret (some 
even use the word ‘self-determination’). In other contexts, however, the 
historian engages in reasoned attribution, finding what he/she considers 
to be ‘self-determination’ in certain words and actions. For example, Tim 
Rowse presents certain actions and words of Torres Strait Islanders in 
the 1970s as ‘self-determination’, notwithstanding their explicit demand 
to remain within Australian sovereignty. What the historian considers 
‘self-determination’ to mean is, therefore, an important question for 
historians’ practice, an aspect of the question that animates this book: ‘How 
shall we write the history of Australian Indigenous self-determination?’
64  Berndt, An Adjustment Movement, 87.
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Haynes’s account of Hunter is grounded in the view that Aboriginal 
people were ‘self-determining’ when they first came to the settlement 
at Maningrida and when they left for outstations. By characterising 
Indigenous agency this way, Haynes is able to describe the space that was 
open to Hunter’s prefiguring of self-determination, that is, a space defined 
by people sometimes not taking up what governments offered. The gap 
between white official (assimilationist) expectations and actual Aboriginal 
behaviour is sometimes described as Aboriginal ‘resistance’ to assimilation, 
and this indeed is the term Haynes chooses. In the story as Haynes tells 
it, the historian does not need to find evidence of an articulate Aboriginal 
concept of self-determination; ‘self-determination’ was prefigured in 
Hunter’s practice to the extent that he acknowledged and bent to realities 
(geographical, human) that were beyond government control.
If Indigenous agency is to be treated historically, the story of the 
emergence of Indigenous points of view will include discursive gaps, 
silences and hesitations. For example, reviewing gains made by Indigenous 
Australians in the period 1967–77, Nugget Coombs (chair of the Council 
for Aboriginal Affairs, 1967–76) celebrated Arnhem Land’s outstation 
movement as self-determination in action, before commenting that in 
several other domains of public policy – education, health and housing 
– self-determination had not yet displaced assimilation.65 By way of 
explanation, he mentioned government inertia, as well as Indigenous 
Australians not yet having had time to consider and to articulate 
their distinctive needs for education, health and housing. The point 
should not be missed by historians: willingness and capacity to speak 
programmatically has developed unevenly across Australian regions and 
across policy domains. Not every instance of Indigenous aspiration is as 
articulate as the statements from the Tent Embassy, cited by Jon Altman.
Elizabeth Ganter’s chapter exemplifies another way to attribute Indigenous 
conceptions of ‘self-determination’. The term ‘self-determination’ is 
nowhere in the 1977 Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration (RCAGA) report, yet Ganter shows how we might find it 
implicit. Some recommendations of the report were a (neglected) stimulus 
to ‘self-determination’, as she understands that concept. Ganter is explicit 
in deriving her conception of self-determination from recent political 
theories of representation that urge democratic states to recruit public 
65  Coombs, Australia’s Policy Towards Aborigines.
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servants diversely. A state committed to Indigenous self-determination 
would ask: how can Indigenous public servants be ‘both grounded … in 
their communities and empowered … in government decision-making’? 
Ganter argues that certain RCAGA recommendations in effect addressed 
that question: they looked positively on the possibility that Indigenous 
individuals would be mobile between public service employment and 
working in the Indigenous sector, thus ‘building relationships between 
Indigenous administrators on the inside and their communities and 
organisations on the outside’. Ganter reports from her own interviews with 
Indigenous officers of the Northern Territory Government that many of 
her interviewees were mobile between government and Indigenous sector 
employment, just as the RCAGA recommendations had imagined. Her 
task as historian is thus to theorise these peoples’ careers as an emergent 
practice of self-determination.
Mike Dillon’s chapter is a third example of the possibility of inferring 
Indigenous conceptions of ‘self-determination’ from the practices of 
Indigenous people. His question is: in what ways could public sector 
capital funds have contributed to Indigenous self-determination? Writing 
from a normative standpoint, Dillon’s history of Indigenous Business 
Australia and the Indigenous Land Corporation and its associated Land 
Fund affirms a procedural notion of self-determination: that decision-
making about the use of funds should maximise Indigenous participation 
at the highest level. When considering whether these investment decisions 
have achieved greater self-determination, he is more cautious. Noting 
that Indigenous people have different views about the forms that capital 
might take, he declines to say which uses of the capital funds he thinks 
would lead more to ‘assimilation’ than to outcomes more distinctively 
Indigenous. Instead, he alludes to ongoing debates among Indigenous 
Australians about how best to invest these funds. Such debates were 
crucial in defining what we might refer to as the Indigenous vision of 
self-determination, but little is yet known of them.
The limits of the settler colonial liberal 
nation‑state
Some narratives of the historical failure of self-determination in Australia 
are grounded in a theory of the limited ability of settler colonial states 
to enable Indigenous autonomy. Gillian Cowlishaw argued that 
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self-determination in Australia created only ‘a semblance of autonomous 
governmental structures’ that were always subject to state strictures and 
regulations: ‘self-determination did not mean laissez-faire or autonomy 
from the state at all’.66 In fact, self-determination policies had more to do 
with the settler colonial state repositioning itself as ‘the liberator from past 
oppression’ and disavowing its racist past than about eradicating racial 
inequalities.67 Francesca Merlan concluded that, under self-determination, 
the state replaced ‘overt coercion’ with a mode of seeking to ‘elicit from 
Aboriginal people … their own modes of organisation’ in order to ‘recast 
the management of Aboriginal affairs in what are seen to be indigenous 
terms’.68 That is, the state did not and perhaps cannot cease to authorise 
(or disallow) versions of Indigenous tradition.
It remains unclear whether the Australian case illustrates deep limits to the 
settler colonial state’s sympathetic recognition of Indigenous difference. 
If there were such limits, then self-determination would be marked by 
contradiction and failure. For Peter Sutton, clashes between custom and 
corporate accountability under self-determination were symptomatic of 
a deeper contradiction between ‘modernism and cultural traditionalism’ 
within the very idea of self-determination.69 Self-determination pursued 
Indigenous sameness in some ways and Indigenous difference in others, 
but the rationale for when or why one or the other was preferred was 
never articulated. In an influential critique of Australian multiculturalism, 
Elizabeth Povinelli has argued that the settler colonial state’s approach 
to culture – liberal multiculturalism – asserts the sovereign right to 
selectively approve differentiated aspects of Indigenous culture: there 
was no scope for Aboriginal practices that were contrary to governments’ 
agenda.70 Anthropologist Emma Kowal also argued that the contradictory 
pursuit of sameness and difference is inherent to liberal multiculturalism. 
The  ‘postcolonial logic’ that ‘prevailed in the self-determination era’ 
sought to eliminate inequality (which she calls ‘remedialism’) while 
also maintaining essential difference (‘orientalism’).71 Altman, in this 
volume, describes the ‘twin logics’ of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) Act 1976, namely ‘justice by returning ancestral lands’ while 
66  Cowlishaw, ‘Helping Anthropologists, Still’, 53.
67  Cowlishaw, ‘Erasing Culture and Race’, 147.
68  Merlan, Caging the Rainbow, 150.
69  Sutton, The Politics of Suffering, 59.
70  Povinelli, The Cunning; Cowlishaw, ‘Helping Anthropologists, Still’, 53. 
71  Kowal, ‘The Politics of the Gap’, 338.
INDIGENoUS SELf‑DETERMINATIoN IN AUSTRALIA
26
also ‘improving socio-economic marginality’. These clashing logics 
mirror the ‘postcolonial logic’ that Kowal identifies. For Altman, these 
tensions within self-determination were exacerbated by recent Australian 
Government policies.
In this perspective, Australia, as a settler colony, must fail its projects of 
self-determination. A settler colonial state must continually contain and 
erase Indigenous sovereignty if it is to uphold its own legitimacy. In one 
version of this view, self-determination rhetoric was window-dressing 
for a new iteration of colonising policies. Elizabeth Strakosch refers to 
an unresolved ‘foundational sovereign conflict’; that is, an underlying 
clash of sovereignties between the settler colonial state and Australia’s 
Indigenous people. Although Indigenous policy may appear to pursue ‘self-
determination’, it does not and cannot address the underlying structures. 
Quite the opposite: by acting unilaterally on Indigenous people (treating 
them as legitimate subjects of the state), and by representing Indigenous 
people as problems for the settler colonial state to address, Indigenous 
policy entrenches the colonial relationship.72 This was also true ‘despite 
the rhetoric of the self-determination era’.73
It follows from this perspective that the settler state’s apparent concessions 
to forms of Indigeneity are always only ever strategic and that they render, 
eliminate or erase Indigenous people. In Patrick Wolfe’s theory, settler 
colonies are ‘premised on the elimination of native societies’.74 For him, 
‘a range of historical practices’ that ‘might otherwise appear distinct’ can all 
be understood through this lens.75 These practices include, more recently, 
Australian Government policies that appear to celebrate Indigeneity: these 
are ‘strategic pluralism’.76 According to this theory, government policies of 
self-determination, despite any benevolent appearances, further processes 
of elimination. It would, in fact, be impossible for the settler colonial 
state to genuinely pursue Indigenous self-determination as this would 
threaten its claim to legitimate sovereignty. It follows from this view that 
Indigenous self-determination can only ever be a project in opposition to 
the settler state.
72  Strakosch, ‘The Technical Is Political’, 116, 120.
73  Brigg and Maddison, ‘Unsettling Governance’, 6.
74  Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, 2.
75  Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, 163.
76  Wolfe, Settler Colonialism, 167.
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This theory of the settler colonial state presents the relationship between 
Indigenous and settler authorities in zero-sum terms, such that Indigenous 
engagement with policies of self-determination is destined to fail and/or 
be self-deluding. We feel wary of this theoretical framework because it 
supposes reconciliation to be impossible, a process of mutual self-delusion. 
What is the historian to say of Indigenous people who have sought to work 
with and gain concessions from the settler colonial state (as many still do), 
not seeing their gains as merely illusory? As Borrows and Tully comment 
in their critique of the limits of settler colonial theory, ‘independence and 
interdependence have characterised Indigenous–settler relationships for 
centuries’.77 We read the history of settler–Indigenous relationships as 
shaped by historical particularities, interdependence and political agency 
on each side, even as these can be understood within a broader colonial 
structure. We favour histories that offer Australians a broader range of 
political resources and possible futures as they pursue their interests.
The successes of self‑determination
Thus we question the thesis that self-determination has failed entirely. 
Of course, Indigenous people have consistently asserted sovereignty and 
have been ‘self-determining’ in their resistance to and engagement with 
colonising powers; this form of self-determination has persisted under all 
kinds of policy agendas and continues today. In addition to this, we can 
identify some ways in which the policy suite introduced by the Whitlam 
Government enabled Indigenous people wider choices and greater control 
for themselves and their communities.
Phillip Falk and Gary Martin point out the multiple ways in which 
Indigenous people today have rights to ‘self-determination and self-
management’.78 While they concede that there are always limits on 
Indigenous control, disputes and policy failures, they argue that Indigenous 
people are exercising authority across many domains in which, 50 years 
ago, they had little control. On territorial sovereignty, there is lands rights 
legislation, native title land and land granted through the Indigenous 
Land Corporation. In health, there are now Indigenous medical centres 
and Indigenous health professionals. In education there are Indigenous 
77  Borrows and Tully, ‘Introduction’, 8.
78  Falk and Martin, ‘Misconstruing Indigenous Sovereignty’, 40.
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pre-primary, primary and secondary schools, and Indigenous student 
support centres in TAFEs and universities as well as Indigenous education 
institutes. Indigenous people are now co-managers of some national parks 
and involved in land and water management beyond parks. The federal 
Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 1976 has also enabled Indigenous 
people a degree of self-government on the local level.79 Moreover, on the 
level of the individual, many Indigenous people have more options in 
their lives than ever before. But, as Stan Grant remarked, Indigenous 
successes such as these are ignored in the face of an overwhelming narrative 
of failure:
65 per cent of Indigenous people in Australia (360,000) are 
employed and living lives, materially and socio-economically, 
like those of other Australians … There is a story here, a story 
largely untold. It is a story of success and how it is spurned like an 
unwanted child.80
Such achievements, on the individual and communal level, must have 
a historical explanation. We suggest they can be explained historically 
by the operation of three strands of self-determination identified in this 
book: international law, Indigenous political ambition and the policy 
suites that issued from the 1960s and were declared as ‘self-determination’ 
in the 1970s.
Of course, the achievements of self-determination have also been uneven. 
This very unevenness has, perhaps, contributed to the widespread view 
that self-determination failed entirely. On the level of the individual, 
many of those who were best able to take advantage of self-determination 
were those who had experienced policies of assimilation most intensely. 
We see this in the ways that mission and church leaders rose to positions 
of secular leadership under self-determination. We also see this in the ways 
that skills some gained under assimilation policies, particularly literacy in 
English, became useful and politically potent. Indigenous women have, 
perhaps, been better positioned to take advantage of self-determination 
on an individual level, despite their marginal role in some formal 
institutions of self-determination. The gendering of assimilation around 
feminine domesticity in some ways created employment opportunities for 
Indigenous women under the economic changes of 1980s as well as kinds 
79  Falk and Martin, ‘Misconstruing Indigenous Sovereignty’, 41.
80  Grant, ‘The Australian Dream’, 68.
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of jobs in demand (particularly in administration, health and education) 
under self-determination.81 It is also true, however, that women bore the 
brunt of what are often identified as self-determination’s failures: drug and 
alcohol abuse, family violence and community disorder. The gendering of 
self-determination is an area that requires further research.
In linking assimilation and self-determination in this way we are 
presenting a contestable history of ‘assimilation’. We would argue that, 
in many ways, assimilation policies created a class of people ready to 
take advantage of self-determination policies. But this was not because 
they were assimilated; on the contrary, many of them had already joined 
together to denounce and oppose assimilation. The political experience 
of resistance to assimilatory policies and the creation of pan-Aboriginal 
identities in opposition to assimilation laid the ground for even greater 
gains in the 1970s. As Grant put it:
Assimilation was about how government tried to control this 
‘problem’, but it was also about how we negotiated this new reality 
… It is a mark of the strength of Aboriginal people that they not 
only endured this, but responded with renewed demands for 
equality and rights. The Aboriginal political movement found its 
voice, campaigning for full citizenship and jobs.82
It was not necessarily easy for Indigenous people who were most 
acculturated to settler colonial society to adopt the empowered positions 
that self-determination policies created. Often these very people faced new 
challenges of legitimation to their communities under self-determination. 
They were sometimes seen as too ‘Aboriginal’ for the state, but too ‘white’ 
for many Indigenous activists. As Francesca Merlan points out, in the 
1970s, the very people who were ‘marching in the front ranks towards 
assimilation’ became, in some contexts, ‘marginal to a policy that now 
valorised Aborigines’ cultural continuity’.83 
81  Haebich, Spinning the Dream, 124.
82  Grant, ‘The Australian Dream’, 77.
83  Merlan, Dynamics of Difference, 163–64.
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The future of self‑determination
Self-determination continues as a topic for Indigenous Australian 
political theory.84 We conclude by pointing to two questions faced in such 
theoretical work.
First, the federal structure of the settler colonial state provides 
opportunities. As Will Sanders’s survey of local government reminds 
us, it is not only at the national level that significant policy decisions 
are made: Australian federalism also makes sub-national governments 
effective shapers of the processes through which Indigenous Australians 
are governed and through which they may govern themselves. At the time 
of writing, two jurisdictions (Victoria and the Northern Territory) are 
considering agreements with the Aboriginal people whose countries fall 
within their borders. Both jurisdictions will create models from which the 
other six sub-national jurisdictions will learn.
Second, the relationship between the individual ‘self ’ and the collective 
‘self ’ is becoming problematic as people enact the right to self-
identification. Mick Dodson declared in 1994 that ‘the right to control 
one’s own identity is part of the broader right to self-determination; that 
is, the right of a people to determine its political status and to pursue its 
own economic, social and cultural development’.85 In this formulation, 
the dual meaning of ‘one’ (a person, a people) presents a question of 
identity that remains to be resolved by Aboriginal communities.
The roots of this second problem are found in one of the policy changes 
that  blurs the temporal boundary between ‘assimilation’ and ‘self-
determination’ policy eras. Australian practices of self-determination 
include a census questionnaire, reformed between the 1966 and 1971 
censuses, that allows a person to identity as ‘Aboriginal’ without the 
respondent having to consider whether he or she is ‘half ’ or ‘one-quarter’ 
Aboriginal (as he/she was obliged to do in the 1966 Census). In confidential 
responses to the census, the claim to be Aboriginal or Torres Strait 
Islander is not subject to any qualifying ‘blood’ test: the individual is truly 
autonomous in self-identification. However, Indigenous identity is also 
a public matter in that policy regimes attach finite, palpable benefits to 
successful assertions of Indigenous identity. Those who consider themselves 
84  For example Vivian et al., ‘Indigenous Self-government’.
85  Dodson, ‘The Wentworth Lecture the End in the Beginning’, 5.
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entitled, as Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander persons, have an interest in 
policing the boundary between who can have the benefit and who cannot. 
Nakata is critical of the Australian Government’s identification protocol 
for conferring on Indigenous ‘community’ organisations a responsibility 
to inspect and verify (or not) an individual’s public assertion of Aboriginal 
or Torres Strait Islander status.
Alexis Wright recently asked: ‘What kind of people are we?’ She answered: 
‘We are becoming more complicated. Were we ever more individualistic 
in spirit than we are today?’86 One recent ethnographic inscription of 
‘Indigeneity’ highlighted the individual as the unit of ‘self-determination’. 
According to a study of cultural practice in the Melbourne home 
of an Indigenous woman named Maree: ‘Culture-making occurs in 
a  self-determined place where Maree has curated safety and belonging 
for informal, intercultural exchanges exemplifying decolonising 
co-production in contemporary, cosmopolitan Melbourne’.87 As well, 
Elizabeth Watt and Emma Kowal have used recently collected interview 
data to illustrate the terms in which ‘an increasing number of Australians 
are identifying as Indigenous later in life’ – terms that may not persuade 
invigilating Indigenous organisations.88 The question of who is the ‘self ’ 
of Indigenous self-determination, it seems, will become more complex 
with more possible answers in coming years.
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